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CONSUME OR INVEST: WHAT DO/SHOULD AGENCY 
LEADERS MAXIMIZE? 
William E. Kovacic
*
 & David A. Hyman
**
 
Abstract: In the regulatory state, agency leaders face a fundamental choice: should they 
“consume,” or should they “invest”? “Consume” means launching high profile cases and 
rulemaking projects. “Invest” means developing and nurturing the necessary infrastructure 
for the agency to handle whatever the future may bring. The former brings headlines, while 
the latter will be completely ignored. Unsurprisingly, consumption is routinely prioritized, 
and investment is deferred, downgraded, or overlooked entirely. This Article outlines the 
incentives for agency leadership to behave in this way and explores the resulting agency 
costs (pun intended). The U.S. Federal Trade Commission’s health care portfolio provides a 
useful case study of how one agency managed and minimized these costs. Our Article 
concludes with several proposals that should help encourage agency leadership to strike a 
better balance between consumption and investment.  
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INTRODUCTION 
“[P]art of public service is planting trees under whose shade you’ll 
never sit . . . .”1 
 
In the management cliché hall of fame, the all-time winner is pick the 
“low hanging fruit.”2 Of course, obtaining high-value results with a 
minimum of effort is excellent advice, at least as a starting point. But, as 
a general principle, the message is extremely short sighted. Unless 
leaders plant trees, there will be neither shade nor fruit for future 
generations to enjoy. 
The conflict between picking and planting—between consuming and 
investing—is a policy perennial. Good leaders know that any success 
they may achieve depends on the investment decisions made by their 
predecessors. In like fashion, good leaders also know that many of the 
benefits of any investment they make will be captured by their 
successors. 
Agency leaders are not angels.
3
 They are human beings, who desire 
personal recognition and advancement. Investment in institutional 
capability and capacity does not result in newspaper headlines, popular 
acclaim, or the offer of a high-paying private sector job. Instead, it is the 
announcement of a “big” case or rulemaking that casts agency leadership 
in a positive light. 
If there is no turnover in agency leadership this dynamic would not 
                                                     
1. Hillary Clinton Transcript, Building the ‘Growth and Fairness Economy,’ WALL ST. J. (July 
13, 2015, 12:46 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2015/07/13/hillary-clinton-transcript-building-
the-growth-and-fairness-economy/ [https://perma.cc/946P-R7LL].  
2. Lucy Kinder, Office Jargon: The Worst Culprits in Management Speak, TELEGRAPH (Oct. 21, 
2013, 3:08 PM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/jobs/10393668/Office-jargon-The-worst-
culprits-in-management-speak.html [https://perma.cc/EUE2-PRLL].  
3. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 356 (James Madison) (Benjamin F. Wright ed., 1961) (“If men 
were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to govern men, neither external nor 
internal controls on government would be necessary. In framing a government which is to be 
administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the government 
to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself. A dependence on the people 
is, no doubt, the primary control on the government; but experience has taught mankind the 
necessity of auxiliary precautions.”). 
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create a major problem: “[w]hen agency leadership does not change, the 
leaders capture the benefits (and bear[] the costs) of the outcomes in the 
cases that they initiate.”4 But agency leadership is never indefinite. 
Indeed, in most of the administrative state, political appointees come and 
go quite frequently.
5
 A timely departure makes it possible for agency 
leaders to “‘outrun their mistakes,’ so that when blame-time arrives, the 
burden will fall on someone else.”6 In practice, this means that agency 
leaders have a significant incentive to launch big cases or rulemaking 
without being overly concerned about the agency’s capability and 
capacity to deliver the goods.
7
 Stated more concretely, agency leaders 
will predictably and systematically slight investment and prioritize 
consumption. I.B.G.-Y.B.G. (“I’ll be gone, you’ll be gone”) does not 
apply only to Wall Street.
8
 
                                                     
4. David A. Hyman & William E. Kovacic, Can’t Anyone Here Play This Game? Judging the 
FTC’s Critics, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1948, 1973 n.151 (2015). 
5. PETER H. SCHUCK, WHY GOVERNMENT FAILS SO OFTEN AND HOW IT CAN DO BETTER 316–
17 (2014) (“A study of presidential appointees . . . found an overall median tenure of only 2.5 years; 
one quarter of them served more than 3.6 years while another quarter served for less than eighteen 
months.”). 
6. Hyman & Kovacic, supra note 4, at 1973 n.151 (quoting ROBERT JACKALL, MORAL MAZES: 
THE WORLD OF CORPORATE MANAGERS 90 (1988)). King and Crewe study the behavior of cabinet 
ministers and other senior officials in the United Kingdom, and reach the same conclusion:  
The sheer passage of time may also result in non-accountability. By the time the Thatcher 
government’s exciting new personal pensions had been mis-sold on a vast scale, the relevant 
ministers and probably most of their senior officials had long since passed on. It would have 
been almost impossible to hold any of them to account . . . . [T]he relationship in British 
politics between, on the one hand, long-term success and failure and, on the other, personal 
triumph and disgrace is all but non-existent. Most blunderers, however gross their blunders, go 
unpunished.  
ANTHONY KING & IVOR CREWE, THE BLUNDERS OF OUR GOVERNMENTS 354, 359 (2014).  
7. Timothy J. Muris, Principles for a Successful Competition Agency, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 165, 166 
(2005) (“An agency head garners great attention by beginning ‘bold’ initiatives and suing big 
companies. When the bill comes due for the hard work of turning initiatives into successful 
regulation and proving big cases in court, these agency heads are often gone from the public stage. 
Their successors are left either to trim excessive proposals or even to default, with possible damage 
to agency reputation. The departed agency heads, if anyone in the Washington establishment now 
cares about their views, can always blame failure on faulty implementation by their successors.”). 
8. Eric Dash, What’s Really Wrong with Wall Street Pay, N.Y. TIMES: ECONOMIX (Sept. 18, 
2009, 2:31 PM), http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/09/18/whats-really-wrong-with-wall-
street-pay/?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/3YSF-5H6H] (“A major cause of the current crisis will most 
likely prove to be a mismatch of incentives for Wall Street traders. If a mortgage trader made a big 
bet, he had the chance to land a big bonus if it paid off (and his boss did, too). If, however, that bet 
didn’t pan out — and the trader lost a lot of money for the firm — he might receive no bonus at all. 
On the contrary, he might get a princely severance package. But one thing seems pretty clear: That 
trader would not receive a ‘negative bonus.’ In other words, he did not personally incur the cost of 
the trading blowup. Indeed, the open secret on Wall Street was that traders did not risk losing their 
own money — just the chance of receiving an enormous payout. Economists call this a moral 
hazard problem. In bankerspeak, it’s known as the ‘I.B.G.-Y.B.G.’ issue — as in ‘I’ll Be Gone and 
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Building on our previous work,
9
 we show the importance of balancing 
consumption against investment. We focus on the policy mismatches 
that arise when short-term political appointees lead governmental 
agencies with long-term policy needs—but our analysis also applies to 
private and nonprofit firms. We also discuss measures that can serve to 
counteract inadequate attention to investment. The Federal Trade 
Commission’s (FTC) health care program illustrates the importance and 
benefits of sustained investments in capability. 
Part I describes how investments in agency capability provide the 
necessary foundation on which an agency builds successful cases, rules, 
and other policy initiatives. Part II examines the structural and political 
incentives that encourage agency leadership to systematically privilege 
consumption over investment. Part III provides a case study of the 
FTC’s health care portfolio, where investments in policy research and 
development (R&D) have played a critical role in generating policy 
success. Part IV identifies a few modest strategies that might encourage 
the prioritization of investment by agency leaders. Part V addresses 
objections that might be raised against a rebalancing of consumption and 
investment. 
I. THE NEED FOR INVESTMENT 
In this Article, we focus on agencies similar to the FTC, but the 
framework we describe applies to many governmental agencies. 
                                                     
You’ll Be Gone’ if the trade goes south.”). 
The same dynamic has been noted in international development projects:  
When those who design development projects and get them approved by relevant authorities, 
move on, get promoted, and are not held accountable for results, is that not a case of you’ll be 
gone and I’ll be gone? If you are not going to be held accountable for implementation and 
results you don’t have to worry about whether or not the project will produce results under real 
world conditions. You can cut and paste global best practice on a technical issue into projects 
to be implemented in vastly different environments. Job done. When implementation 
challenges inevitably arise and hold things up, well, that is somebody else’s problem. For the 
design team it is a case of “I’ll be gone and you’ll be gone.”  
Sina Odugbemi, I’ll Be Gone and You’ll Be Gone, WORLD BANK: PEOPLE, SPACES, DELIBERATION 
(Sept. 23, 2009), http://blogs.worldbank.org/publicsphere/ill-be-gone-and-youll-be-gone 
[https://perma.cc/VT88-S9R2].  
9. Hyman & Kovacic, supra note 4; David A. Hyman & William E. Kovacic, Institutional 
Design, Agency Life Cycle, and the Goals of Competition Law, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 2163 (2013) 
[hereinafter Hyman & Kovacic, Institutional Design]; David A. Hyman & William E. Kovacic, Why 
Who Does What Matters: Governmental Design and Agency Performance, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
1446 (2014) [hereinafter Hyman & Kovacic, Agency Performance]; William E. Kovacic & David 
A. Hyman, Competition Agency Design: What’s on the Menu?, 8 EUR. COMPETITION J. 527 (2012); 
David A. Hyman & William E. Kovacic, Competition Agencies with Complex Policy Portfolios: 
Divide or Conquer? 33, 42, in COMPETITION LAW ON THE GLOBAL STAGE (Nicolas Charbit & Elisa 
Ramundo eds., 2014) [hereinafter Hyman & Kovacic, Divide or Conquer].  
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Regulatory agencies, like the FTC, have a wide variety of policy 
instruments at their disposal.
10
 A regulatory agency can prosecute cases, 
promulgate rules, conduct studies, issue reports, convene public 
consultations, issue guidelines, and have agency personnel give 
speeches. To apply these tools effectively, the agency must do three 
things well: it must understand the behavior it observes; it must decide 
whether the behavior is sufficiently problematic to justify intervention; 
and it must then choose among the various alternative solutions. 
Competent performance of these three tasks requires substantial 
institutional capability and capacity—and expert performance requires 
substantially more than that.
11
 Developing the necessary capability and 
capacity requires an agency to invest effectively in five distinct domains: 
hiring personnel, developing administrative infrastructure, building 
depth and currency of substantive knowledge, establishing internal 
decision-making procedures, and engaging effectively with other 
organizations and leaders. 
The first investment domain is hiring personnel. The agency must 
find, hire, and retain skilled professionals and other personnel. And, 
once the personnel are hired, they must be organized into teams. For 
example, the FTC has separate Bureaus for Competition, Consumer 
Protection, and Economics. The Bureau of Competition and the Bureau 
of Consumer Protection are staffed by lawyers; the Bureau of Economics 
is staffed by economists.
12
 As we have noted elsewhere, “[t]he 
                                                     
10. For a discussion of how effective policy making often requires a wide range of instruments, 
see More than Law Enforcement: The FTC’s Many Tools—A Conversation with Tim Muris and Bob 
Pitofsky, 72 ANTITRUST L.J. 773 (2005) [hereinafter Muris/Pitofsky Conversation]; Maureen K. 
Ohlhausen, Comm’r, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Reflections on the Supreme Court’s North Carolina 
Dental Decision and the FTC’s Campaign to Rein in State Action Immunity 11 (Mar. 31, 2015), 
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/634091/150403hertiagedental.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/GU29-58YV] (“[O]ur state action efforts, like most of our contributions to the 
development of the antitrust laws, depended on the broad use of all of our agency functions – 
including research, advocacy, administrative litigation, and federal court enforcement.” (emphasis 
added)). 
11. “Capacity” refers to the level of human talent and supporting resources needed to carry out 
the agency’s assigned functions. “Capability” refers to whether the agency has the statutory 
authority, organizational structure, and quality control mechanisms needed to execute its mission 
effectively. The importance of these factors is examined in Hyman & Kovacic, Agency 
Performance, supra note 9; William E. Kovacic, The Digital Broadband Migration and the Federal 
Trade Commission: Building the Competition and Consumer Protection Agency of the Future, 8 J. 
ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. 1, 7 (2010); see also KING & CREWE, supra note 6, at 382–84 
(identifying “skills shortages” as an important cause of governmental failure). 
12. See Luke M. Froeb et al., The Economics of Organizing Economists, 76 ANTITRUST L.J. 569 
(2009) (describing the impact of relying on multidisciplinary teams of lawyers and economists 
versus having lawyers and economists organized into separate bureaus); Hyman & Kovacic, Divide 
or Conquer, supra note 9.  
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government is already thickly planted with bureaus, agencies, and inter-
agency working groups, departments and commissions”—and each has 
its own internal organization designed to effectuate the statutory 
mission.
13
 
Whatever organizational configuration is chosen, a successful 
operating unit will contain teams with strong analytical skills and deep 
expertise in the relevant subject matter.
14
 Good teams prosper by reason 
of their intellectual acumen and intuition, honed by repeated study of 
specific problems. For example, the FTC economists and lawyers who 
review mergers in the pharmaceutical industry have analyzed dozens of 
transactions over the past few decades.
15
 They have a sophisticated 
understanding of individual firms, drug research pipelines, and industry 
trends. The specific individuals staffing this area have changed over 
time, but the FTC pharmaceutical mergers team has sustained a good 
mix of experienced managers and case handlers and newer employees 
who learn from longstanding team members. 
The second investment domain is developing an administrative 
infrastructure (both personnel and physical facilities) to support 
substantive projects. A major component of the FTC’s consumer 
protection work consists of prosecuting fraudulent schemes involving 
health care products and services.
16
 These and other antifraud initiatives 
benefitted immensely from investments the FTC made in the 1990s to 
build an electronic database (Consumer Sentinel) that collects and 
                                                     
13. Hyman & Kovacic, Divide or Conquer, supra note 9, at 28; see also Jennifer Nou, Intra-
Agency Coordination, 129 HARV. L. REV. 421 (2015).  
14. See WILLIAM E. KOVACIC, FED. TRADE COMM’N, THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION AT 100: 
INTO OUR 2ND CENTURY 46–49 (2009), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_ 
statements/federal-trade-commission-100-our-second-century/ftc100rpt.pdf [https:// perma.cc/T9SG 
-C9AB] (noting the importance of talented personnel to FTC performance). 
15. MARKUS H. MEIER ET AL., FED. TRADE COMM’N, OVERVIEW OF FTC ANTITRUST ACTIONS IN 
PHARMACEUTICAL SERVICES AND PRODUCTS 26–64 (2013), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/ 
files/attachments/competition-policy-guidance/rxupdate.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y28J-VCE3] 
(discussing FTC pharmaceutical mergers program). 
16. See, e.g., Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, All 50 States and D.C. Charge Four Cancer 
Charities with Bilking Over $187 Million from Consumers (May 19, 2015), 
http://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2015/05/ftc-all-50-states-dc-charge-four-cancer-
charities-bilking-over [https://perma.cc/D2RE-BPEU]; Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, 
Company Touting Unproven Cancer Treatment Agrees to Settle FTC Charges (July 24, 2002), 
http://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2002/07/company-touting-unproven-cancer-
treatment-agrees-settle-ftc [https://perma.cc/4M3Y-KBHV]; Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, No 
Silver Lining for Marketers of Bogus Supplement; Federal Agencies Crack Down on Health Fraud 
(June 19, 2003), http://ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2003/06/no-silver-lining-marketers-
bogus-supplement-federal-agencies [https://perma.cc/7M5N-B3VJ].  
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analyzes complaints about alleged misconduct.
17
 By amassing 
complaints received by the FTC and a variety of governmental and 
nongovernmental partners, Consumer Sentinel enables the FTC’s 
consumer protection specialists to quickly identify fraudulent scams, and 
assemble the evidence necessary to initiate litigation.
18
 Thus, the 
investment in Consumer Sentinel made it much easier for the FTC to 
detect and remedy serious fraud on a real-time basis.
19
 
The FTC has made similar investments supporting its mobile 
telephony programs.
20
 Communications technology is one of the most 
dynamic areas of commerce, and the FTC has to continuously invest to 
keep up. In response, the FTC has hired technologists with expertise in 
the relevant technical disciplines and established an internal “mobile 
laboratory” to detect fraud in the use of mobile telephones.21 
The third investment domain is building depth and currency of 
substantive knowledge. As described above, one element of this 
knowledge base is the accumulated experience of agency personnel, who 
develop expertise in specific industries and commercial practices.
22
 But, 
                                                     
17. See Muris/Pitofsky Conversation, supra note 10, at 789–91 (discussing creation and operation 
of Consumer Sentinel). 
18. Consumer Sentinel Network, FED. TRADE COMMISSION, http://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/ 
consumer-sentinel-network [https://perma.cc/9HWU-BHKX] (last visited Jan. 31, 2016) (describing 
functions of Consumer Sentinel Network). 
19. See Muris/Pitofsky Conversation, supra note 10, at 796–97 (describing the impact of 
Consumer Sentinel). 
20. On the FTC’s programs in this area, see FED. TRADE COMM’N, MOBILE PRIVACY 
DISCLOSURES: BUILDING TRUST THROUGH TRANSPARENCY (2013), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/ 
default/files/documents/reports/mobile-privacy-disclosures-building-trust-through-transparency-
federal-trade-commission-staff-report/130201mobileprivacyreport.pdf [https://perma.cc/MT6B-
8T5N]; FED. TRADE COMM’N, PAPER, PLASTIC . . . OR MOBILE? AN FTC WORKSHOP ON MOBILE 
PAYMENTS (2013), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/paper-plastic-or-
mobile-ftc-workshop-mobile-payments/p0124908_mobile_payments_workshop_report_02-28-
13.pdf [https://perma.cc/UP9F-WTHN]. 
21. See Division of Litigation Technology & Analysis, FED. TRADE COMMISSION, 
http://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc/bureaus-offices/bureau-consumer-protection/our-divisions/division-
litigation-technology [https://perma.cc/3BWR-322N] (last visited Jan. 31, 2016) (describing FTC’s 
Mobile/Internet Lab); Joel Schectman, Q&A David Vladeck, Former Director of FTC Consumer 
Unit, WALL ST. J.: RISK & COMPLIANCE J. (Jan. 22, 2014, 3:39 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/ 
riskandcompliance/2014/01/22/qa-david-vladeck-former-director-of-ftc-consumer-unit/ 
[https://perma.cc/3W2G-RXSW] (“We did not have technologists on staff at the time and to do 
highly technical cases of the kind that we did during my [Vladeck’s] tenure there, and doing still 
today, you need sophisticated forensic work. One of the things we did was bring in technologists to 
have on staff. We set up a laboratory to do forensic work on mobile devices. You need to have 
people who can view evidence captures on mobile devices and really understand the ecosystem 
behind the screen. I think we were the first civil law enforcement agency anywhere that had a fully 
functioning lab for mobile devices.”).  
22. See supra notes 12–14 and accompanying text.  
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an equally important source of an agency’s knowledge base consists of 
investments that are the public policy equivalent of the research and 
development (R&D) expenditures that a private company makes to 
create new or improve existing products.
23
 Such policy R&D
24
 can take 
various forms, including empirical studies of individual sectors or 
commercial phenomena, research concerning the legal predicates for 
future cases, hearings, and public consultations; and retrospective 
assessments of completed agency initiatives.
25
 These measures have a 
common purpose—to improve the agency’s ability to identify areas of 
needed intervention, devise useful remedies, and give advice to 
legislators and other government agencies. The urgency to make these 
investments is especially great in sectors such as health care that feature 
high levels of technological and organizational dynamism.
26
 Congress 
gave the FTC a diverse portfolio of policy R&D tools,
27
 and the 
application of the complete portfolio has figured prominently in the 
                                                     
23. See Andrew I. Gavil, The FTC’s Study and Advocacy Authority in Its Second Century: A Look 
Ahead, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1902, 1905 (2015) (discussing role of “prospective study” to 
enhance FTC’s capacity to understanding emerging industry trends and practices); KOVACIC, supra 
note 14, at 91–109 (describing FTC investments that increase the agency’s knowledge base). 
24. This phrase originated in Timothy J. Muris, Looking Forward: The Federal Trade 
Commission and the Future Development of U.S. Competition Policy, 2003 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 
359 (2003). 
25. See Muris/Pitofsky Conversation, supra note 10, at 774–76 (discussing FTC policy R&D 
tools); Gavil, supra note 23, at 1908–09 (same); William E. Kovacic, Measuring What Matters: The 
Federal Trade Commission and Investments in Competition Policy Research and Development, 72 
ANTITRUST L.J. 861 (2005) (same); KOVACIC, supra note 14, at 91–109 (same). 
26. See, e.g., William E. Kovacic, Antitrust in High-Tech Industries: Improving the Federal 
Antitrust Joint Venture, 19 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1097, 1102–03 (2012). Professor Andrew Gavil, 
who headed the FTC’s Office of Policy Planning from 2013 to 2015, cautions that “[a]gencies can 
fall behind the times in a variety of ways. They can be caught unaware of new industry trends and 
practices that impact competition as well as new academic and economic learning and analytical 
methods.” Gavil, supra note 23, at 1907. He explains that “periods of economic transformation” 
feature changes that “can take the form of entirely new industries, novel products or services, 
evolving industry structures and new industry practices, and innovative business models facilitated 
by new technologies.” Id. at 1905. He concludes that “[p]rospective study will be needed to inform 
and thereby better prepare the [FTC] for both advocacy and law enforcement.” Id.; see also Farhad 
Manjoo, For the New Year, Let’s Resolve to Improve Our Tech Literacy, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 23, 
2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/24/technology/for-the-new-year-lets-resolve-to-improve-
our-tech-literacy.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/4QEM-E764] (discussing need for public policy 
makers to improve ability to understand developments in fast-changing technology sectors). 
27. The FTC is specifically authorized to collect information on industrial conditions and 
practices and to publish studies, independent of its law enforcement efforts. 15 U.S.C. §§ 46, 49 
(2012). Their significance is discussed in William E. Kovacic, The Federal Trade Commission as 
Convenor: Developing Regulatory Policy Norms Without Litigation or Rulemaking, 13 COLO. 
TECH. L.J. 17, 19 (2015).  
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agency’s health care programs.28 
A fourth form of investment that fosters program success is the 
development of internal procedures that enable the agency to make 
intelligent decisions about how to deploy its limited resources. There are 
many ways that an agency can structure its internal decision-making 
process.
29
 Good agency practice includes continuing efforts to improve 
these processes to test evidence rigorously and to counteract behavioral 
phenomena that might otherwise cause the agency to slight theories or 
facts that should dictate a reassessment of its views.
30
 
Finally, an agency must “play well with others.” In many fields of 
regulation, policymaking duties are shared by a multiplicity of public 
bodies within individual jurisdictions and across nations.
31
 In a world of 
increasing policymaking multiplicity and fragmentation, the attainment 
of good regulatory solutions requires interagency and inter-jurisdictional 
engagement. Some forms of engagement take place through formal 
mechanisms such as memoranda of understanding between two or more 
agencies, or a network that brings together multiple agencies within a 
single jurisdiction or across jurisdictions.
32
 Others can be highly 
informal, such as regular meetings of senior managers or case handlers 
from different agencies to discuss matters of common concern. These 
formal and informal means of coordination and cooperation do not 
happen without investment—although investment does not guarantee 
that other agencies will decide to make nice.
33
 
                                                     
28. Gavil, supra note 23, at 1908–10 (describing diversified FTC policy making approach in 
health care); see also Ohlhausen, supra note 10, at 8–11 (same). 
29. See William E. Kovacic et al., Merger Control Procedures and Institutions: A Comparison of 
EU and U.S. Practice, 59 ANTITRUST BULL. 55 (2014) (comparing European Union and United 
States merger control processes); supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
30. James C. Cooper & William E. Kovacic, Behavioral Economics: Implications for Regulatory 
Behavior, 41 J. REG. ECON. 41 (2012) (noting the impact of confirmation bias and other behavioral 
factors on regulators). 
31. Hyman & Kovacic, Agency Performance, supra note 9, at 1480–81. 
32. See Hugh M. Hollman & William E. Kovacic, The International Competition Network: Its 
Past, Current and Future Role, 20 MINN. J. INT’L L. 274 (2011) (describing development of formal 
networks that bring together competition agency officials to discuss matters of common concern); 
Muris/Pitofsky Conversation, supra note 10, at 795 (describing FTC agreements with foreign 
governments to cooperate on consumer protection matters). 
33. There have been periodic bitter disputes between the FTC and the Department of Justice 
(DOJ) over “clearance” (i.e., which agency should handle certain types of cases); the substantive 
content of a report on Section 2 of the Sherman Act; and the DOJ’s recommendation against the 
granting of certiorari in Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056 (11th Cir. 2005), an early 
FTC reverse payment case. One of us (Kovacic) ruefully noted in an interview that despite 
considerable investment by the FTC, “[w]e have an archipelago of policy-makers, with very 
inadequate ferry service between the islands . . . . In too many instances, when you go to visit those 
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An agency that does all of these things increases the chances of 
attaining policy success. The requisite investments will seldom happen 
by accident. Rather, each generation of agency leadership must make a 
commitment to build institutional capability and capacity and 
continuously examine whether it is investing enough and in the right 
things. As we discuss more fully below, these investments are the 
foundation on which good outcomes depend. 
II. THE SIRENS OF CONSUMPTION 
If investment is so important, why do we think that agency leadership 
routinely defers, downgrades, or overlooks it?
34
 The explanation is 
simple: the Sirens of consumption are hard to resist.
35
 What agency 
leader can resist the temptation of being the one to announce an 
attention-grabbing intervention, such as the initiation of a case against a 
major industry player, or the launch of a new rulemaking project? The 
resulting press conference and favorable academic commentary provide 
ready-made opportunities for credit claiming. Professional reputations 
and post–public service employment opportunities will rise or fall 
depending on the volume of an agency’s activity.36 Simply stated, the 
initiation of cases and rulemaking projects are the readily observable 
events by which agency leadership is typically judged.
37
 
                                                     
islands, the inhabitants come out with sticks and torches and try to chase you away.” Jonathan B. 
Baker, Turning on Itself, NEW REPUBLIC (Sept. 14, 2008), https://newrepublic.com/article/63428/ 
turning-itself [https://perma.cc/N4AS-ZMTB].  
34. See Muris, supra note 7. 
35. William E. Kovacic, Rating the Competition Agencies: What Constitutes Good 
Performance?, 16 GEO. MASON L. REV. 903, 922 (2009) (“The perceived imperative to create new 
cases can create a serious mismatch between commitments and capabilities, as the sirens of credit-
claiming beckon today’s manager to overlook the costs that improvident case selection might 
impose on the agency in the future, well after the incumbent manager has departed.”). 
36. Consumption increases post-public service employment opportunities in two ways. First, 
consumption enhances reputation directly by creating opportunities for credit-claiming. Second, 
those responsible for creating a regulatory labyrinth are ideally situated to guide affected firms 
through the maze—and will be handsomely compensated for doing so. In nautical terms, having 
created underwater obstacles at the entry to the harbor, the former regulator then acts as the pilot 
who can bring ships safely to shore. See Hyman & Kovacic, supra note 4 (discussing private sector 
demand for former regulators who played a role in creating regulatory mechanisms).  
37. See KING & CREWE, supra note 6, at 333–45 (noting “hyperactivism” of ministers in U.K.); 
William E. Kovacic, The Modern Evolution of U.S. Competition Policy Enforcement Norms, 71 
ANTITRUST L.J. 377, 404–05, 408–10 (2003) (describing and criticizing tendency of commentators 
to use prosecution of cases as main measure of competition agency quality). Unsurprisingly, the 
preeminent annual ranking of competition agencies focuses chiefly on the prosecution of cases. See 
2015 Rating Enforcement—The Annual Ranking of the World’s Leading Competition Authorities, 18 
GLOBAL COMPETITION REV., June 2015.  
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Worse still, the temporal disconnect between launches and 
(sometimes crash) landings means that agency leadership does not bear 
the full cost of bad outcomes—whether the bad outcome is because the 
case/rulemaking should never have been brought/initiated in the first 
place, or because the case/rulemaking was worth bringing/initiating, but 
failed because there was insufficient capability and capacity to 
successfully handle the matter in question. Indeed, agency leadership 
may not bear any of the costs if they are able to blame their successors 
for the (usually unspecified) mistakes that supposedly caused a bad 
outcome.
38
 
Politics can also encourage excessive and unwise consumption. When 
the price of gasoline rose sharply in the early 1970s, Congress demanded 
that the FTC take action to protect independent refiners from alleged 
overreaching by large, vertically-integrated petroleum companies.
39
 The 
FTC responded in 1973 by filing the Exxon “shared monopolization” 
case,
40
 which sought the vertical disintegration of the eight largest 
petroleum refiners in the United States.
41
 The sprawling case was 
unmanageable from the start, and FTC staff soon saw the matter as a 
professional chain gang where morale and careers went to die.
42
 In 1981, 
after eight years of pretrial discovery, the Commission dismissed the 
case.
43
 Exxon consumed massive resources and inflicted lasting harm on 
the FTC’s reputation.44 
                                                     
38. William E. Kovacic, Federal Antitrust Enforcement in the Reagan Administration: Two 
Cheers for the Disappearance of the Large Firm Defendant in Nonmerger Cases, 12 RES. L. & 
ECON. 173, 189 (1989) (“[A] short-term perspective may incline the manager to launch headline-
grabbing initiatives with inadequate regard for the matter’s underlying merits or the ultimate cost to 
the agency, in resources and reputation, in litigating the case. If the case goes badly, the manager 
responsible for the take-off rarely is held to account for the crash landing. He can hope the passage 
of time will dim memories of his involvement, he can blame intervening agents for their poor 
execution of his good idea, or he can shrug his shoulders and say he was making the best of the 
fundamentally bad situation that policymakers encounter in the nation’s capital.”); see also Muris, 
supra note 7.  
39. William E. Kovacic, The Federal Trade Commission and Congressional Oversight of 
Antitrust Enforcement, 17 TULSA L.J. 587, 637–39 (1982).  
40. In re Exxon Corp., [1973–1976 Transfer Binder] Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 20,388 (Dkt. No. 
8934, July 17, 1973), complaint dismissed, 98 F.T.C. 453 (1981). 
41. Id. The run-up to the case and the political pressure that inspired it are examined in Timothy 
J. Muris & Bilal K. Sayyed, The Long Shadow of Standard Oil: Policy, Petroleum, and Politics at 
the Federal Trade Commission, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 843, 859–64 (2012).  
42. Edward Cowan, Attorneys Quit F.T.C. Oil Case, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 1978, at D1. 
43. In re Exxon Corp., 98 F.T.C. 453, 453 (1981). 
44. William E. Kovacic, Standard Oil Co v. United States and Its Influence on the Conception of 
Competition Policy, 2012 COMPETITION L.J. 89 (2012) (discussing FTC’s prosecution of petroleum 
industry shared monopolization case and its long-term effects on the agency). Kovacic spent two 
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The same pattern recurred thirty years later, albeit with a different 
outcome. The price of gasoline spiked repeatedly between 2000 and 
2008, and members of Congress used a variety of techniques to induce 
the FTC to take action.
45
 In one instance, two members of the Senate 
imposed a “hold” on the nomination of Deborah Majoras to be the 
agency’s chair.46 The hold was released only after the FTC opened an 
investigation into Chevron’s closure of a refinery in Bakersfield, 
California.
47
 
Congress held multiple hearings, during which legislators berated 
agency leaders for allowing gasoline prices to rise. Perhaps the most 
striking of these legislative show-trials was the appearance of Chairman 
Majoras in May 2006 before the Senate Committee on Commerce, 
Science & Transportation to defend an FTC report on the impact of 
Hurricane Katrina and Hurricane Rita on petroleum product prices.
48
 
The report found no evidence of supplier collusion, and instead 
concluded that the observed price spikes were the inevitable result of 
national disasters that severely disrupted refining and transport 
operations.
49
 Despite demagogic and frequently ad hominem 
interrogation, Majoras held firm.
50
 She refused to commit the agency to 
use its antitrust law enforcement powers in a futile, expensive attempt to 
tame forces entirely beyond the agency’s control. 
                                                     
years working on the Exxon case and saw firsthand the corrosive effects of requiring staff to work 
on a matter that everyone involved knew was doomed. 
45. This episode is recounted in Muris & Sayyed, supra note 41, at 903–07. 
46. One of us (Kovacic) was the FTC’s General Counsel at this time and observed the 
congressional moves to delay consideration of the Majoras nomination. 
47. The opening and closing of the FTC inquiry are described in Press Release, Fed. Trade 
Comm’n, FTC Closes Its Investigation of Shell Oils Decision to Close Bakersfield, California, 
Refinery (May 25, 2005), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2005/05/ftc-closes-its-
investigation-shell-oils-decision-close [https://perma.cc/2UAC-9VPL]. 
48. Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Releases Report on Its Investigation of Gasoline 
Price Manipulation and Post-Katrina Gasoline Price Increases (May 22, 2006), https://www.ftc.gov/ 
news-events/press-releases/2006/05/ftc-releases-report-its-investigation-gasoline-price-
manipulation [https://perma.cc/96XJ-QSGB]. The actual report may be downloaded at FED. TRADE 
COMM’N, THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION INVESTIGATION OF GASOLINE MANIPULATION AND 
POST-KATRINA GASOLINE PRICE INCREASES (2006), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/ 
documents/reports/federal-trade-commission-investigation-gasoline-price-manipulation-and-post-
katrina-gasoline-price/060518publicgasolinepricesinvestigationreportfinal.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/YA6C-AS92]. 
49.  FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 48, at vii–x.  
50. See generally Price Gouging: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, Sci., & Transp., 
109th Cong. (2006), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-109shrg71812/html/CHRG-109shrg 
71812.htm [https://perma.cc/NL59-AJUY] [hereinafter Price Gouging Hearing]. An earlier hearing 
in November 2005 involved similar behavior. See Energy Prices CSPAN, (Nov. 9, 2005), 
http://www.c-span.org/video/?189831-2/energy-prices [https://perma.cc/CW8S-V26E].  
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To be sure, the problem is not unique to gasoline. Elected officials 
routinely demand that regulators “do something” when the price of 
heating oil, natural gas, electricity, and other important consumer 
products rises dramatically. Rather than attribute a price increase to 
causes beyond the control of the product’s suppliers, such as a sudden 
boost in input costs, elected officials typically insist that wrongful 
supplier behavior (e.g., collusion, fraud, price gouging) accounts for the 
unwanted event. In these circumstances, the regulator will face intense 
pressure to use its powers to address the problem. Intervention (in the 
form of an investigation or a case) is faster and easier than attempting to 
educate legislators and cabinet officials that the root cause of the market 
shock lies elsewhere—and the intervention may actually be 
counterproductive.
51
 Indeed, the failure to intervene may be viewed by 
members of Congress as dereliction of duty.
52
 
Caving in to the pressure to intervene will provide momentary relief 
to agency leadership, but at a significant long-term institutional cost. 
Filing the Exxon case got Congress off of the FTC’s back, but it inflicted 
painful long-term harm. By the time the bill comes due, those who were 
responsible for the initial decision to intervene will be long gone—and 
they will find it easy to blame their successors if anyone bothers to ask.
53
 
A third factor encouraging consumption is miscalculation of the likely 
difficulty, costs, and risks of the contemplated intervention. The decision 
to launch a case should rest upon a clear-headed understanding of how 
hard it will be to gather relevant evidence; to establish the legal 
                                                     
51. Price-gouging legislation provides a particularly clear example. See Steven Mufson, Congress 
Tells FTC to Define Price Gouging, WASH. POST (May 6, 2006), http://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
wp-dyn/content/article/2006/05/05/AR2006050501626.html [https://perma.cc/LA8D-A5CW] 
(“‘Many economists cringe when they hear politicians talk about price gouging,’ said N. Gregory 
Mankiw, an economics professor at Harvard University and former chairman of President Bush’s 
Council of Economic Advisers. ‘To economists, the price system is central to how market 
economies allocate resources. Sometimes prices need to rise to balance supply and demand, even if 
that outcome is politically unpopular.’”); Michael A. Salinger, Give Your Cabdriver a Fat Tip!, 
WALL ST. J. (June 24, 2006, 12:01 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB115110485824489519 
[https://perma.cc/C9ZY-F46B] (“If the public were to ask my advice on the wisdom of price 
gouging legislation, however, I would counsel against it. When disasters like Katrina and Rita 
occur, prices must go up. The difficulty is that without knowing the details of a disaster, it is 
impossible to specify in advance how much prices need to rise. As result, price-gouging 
legislation—particularly if penalties are severe and enforcement is aggressive—will pose two 
distinct risks. One is that prices will not rise to market-clearing levels and gas stations will run out 
of gasoline. As unpleasant as high-priced gasoline is, running out will be even worse. The other is 
that gas stations will shut down rather than risk an allegation of price gouging.”). 
52. See Price Gouging Hearing, supra note 50 (statement of Sen. Barbara Boxer) (“I’ll tell you, 
we don’t need an FTC like this.”).  
53. See Kovacic, supra note 38.  
15 - Kovacic Hyman.docx (Do Not Delete) 3/27/2016  3:36 PM 
308 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 91:295 
 
foundations of the case; to assemble the type and quality of personnel 
required for effective implementation; and to manage the risks to the 
agency of proceeding. Each of these should be evaluated within the 
context of the agency’s overall portfolio of existing commitments. If an 
agency does not undertake this analysis, leadership will tend to initiate 
matters without a realistic view of what it will take to complete them 
successfully. 
The IBM monopolization case
54
 provides a striking example of the 
problem. The Department of Justice (DOJ) launched the case on the final 
day of Lyndon Johnson’s presidency in January 1969.55 Among other 
relief, the DOJ sought to break IBM into several computer companies.
56
 
It quickly became apparent that the case was in trouble.
57
 The DOJ had 
vastly underestimated the doctrinal, evidentiary, and administrative 
difficulties of seeking to take apart what was, perhaps, the paramount 
exemplar of American technological progress in the post-World War II 
era.
58
 Nor did the DOJ anticipate the scope and ferocity of defense that 
IBM and its external advisors would mount to oppose the government. 
IBM’s ensemble of exceptional trial lawyers and expert economists 
overwhelmed a DOJ prosecution team afflicted with disorganization and 
rapid turnover in personnel.
59
 In 1982, the DOJ abandoned the case,
60
 
                                                     
54. United States v. IBM Corp., [1961–1970 Transfer Binder] Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 45,069 
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 17, 1969) (complaint alleging monopolization and attempted monopolization). 
55. By launching the case on the final day of the Johnson Administration, those responsible 
ensured that the successive Administrations (i.e., Nixon, Ford, Carter, and Reagan) would bear all 
of the costs of bringing the case to completion.  
Similar examples are not hard to find. The Clinton Administration took almost four years to 
prepare privacy regulations pursuant to the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act 
(HIPAA). Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 45 Fed. Reg. 
82,462 (2000), http://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/ocr/privacy/hipaa/administrative/privacyrule/ 
prdecember2000all8parts.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y8UT-VBVA]. These regulations were issued in the 
final month of the Clinton Administration (i.e., on December 28, 2000)—leaving the Bush (43) 
Administration to sort out the complexities, and take the political heat.  
56. See FRANKLIN M. FISHER ET AL., FOLDED, SPINDLED, AND MUTILATED: ECONOMIC 
ANALYSIS AND U.S. v. IBM 353–68 (1983) (reprinting DOJ’s original complaint and amended 
complaint against IBM); The Computer Industry: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust and 
Monopoly, 93d Cong. 5706–08 (1974) (reprinting the DOJ’s preliminary memorandum on relief). 
57. Donald Baker, who served as the DOJ’s Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust from 1976 
to 1977, wrote that “[b]y even the mid-1970s, it was clear that the [IBM] case was a relic.” Donald 
I. Baker, Government Enforcement of Section Two, 61 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 898, 910 (1986). 
58. The history of the IBM case and the DOJ’s missteps in the formulation and litigation of the 
matter are recounted in John E. Lopatka, United States v. IBM: A Monument to Arrogance, 68 
ANTITRUST L.J. 145 (2000). We also based the statements in this paragraph on interviews that 
Kovacic conducted with Edwin Zimmerman, a senior official at the DOJ at the time of the filing of 
the IBM case, and Frederic M. Scherer, who served as the DOJ’s chief economic expert on the case. 
59. IBM’s successful defense against the DOJ case is reviewed in JAMES B. STEWART, THE 
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which had “spanned the terms of five Presidents, nine Attorney 
Generals, and seven Assistant Attorney Generals.”61 The trial consumed 
700 calendar days, generated a transcript of over 104,000 pages, and 
featured 17,000 exhibits.
62
 In Robert Bork’s phrase, the IBM case was 
“the Antitrust Division’s Vietnam.”63 
The Exxon and IBM examples make it clear that an agency’s failure to 
think carefully in advance about its capability to deliver on a single 
major case can be devastating. What happens when agency leadership 
ignores these points and chases the Sirens of consumption on a larger 
scale? The FTC in the 1970s provides a clear case study of what can go 
wrong. As we noted in an earlier Article: 
It is one thing to launch a single bet-the-agency case and entirely 
another to launch a half-dozen of those cases and an equal 
number of significant rulemaking projects simultaneously—let 
alone staff each case and rulemaking project so as to maximize 
the likelihood of good outcomes across the entire portfolio.
64
 
Despite the obvious risks, that is more or less what the FTC did in the 
1970s. Consider a partial list of the agency’s competition matters during 
this period: 
 Shared monopolization cases involving the country’s eight 
leading petroleum refiners (the Exxon case)
65
 and the four 
leading producers of ready-to-eat breakfast cereals;
66
 
 Cases alleging monopolization or attempted monopolization 
based on predatory pricing against leading producers in the 
bread, coffee, and reconstituted lemon juice sectors;
67
 
                                                     
PARTNERS 53–113 (1983). Among the stars of the IBM defense team was David Boies, a young 
partner at Cravath, Swaine & Moore. Years later, Boies headed the litigation trial team in the DOJ’s 
successful prosecution in the late 1990s of Microsoft for illegal monopolization of the market for 
computer operating systems.  
60. In re Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp., 687 F.2d 591, 604 (2d Cir. 1982) (ordering the issue of a writ 
of mandamus directing district court to dismiss complaint in accordance with stipulation of the 
parties). 
61. Baker, supra note 57, at 899 n.13. 
62. BNA, Post-Mortem on IBM Case Provides Forum for Conflicting Perspectives, 42 
ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. 310–11 (1982). 
63. Baker, supra note 57, at 899 n.13 (quoting R. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX (1978)). 
64. Hyman & Kovacic, supra note 4. 
65. Exxon Corp., 98 F.T.C. 453, 456–59 (1981) (complaint alleging agreement to monopolize 
and maintenance of a noncompetitive market structure). 
66. Kellogg Corp., 99 F.T.C. 8, 11–16 (1982) (complaint alleging maintenance of a highly 
concentrated, noncompetitive market structure and shared monopolization). 
67. Gen. Foods Corp., 103 F.T.C. 204, 206–08 (1984) (complaint alleging attempted 
monopolization in production and sale of instant coffee); Int’l Tel. & Tel. Corp., 104 F.T.C. 280, 
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 A challenge to the nation’s leading soft-drink bottlers’ 
longstanding practice of using exclusive territories to 
distribute their products;
68
 
 A case alleging attempted monopolization in the chemicals 
sector by means of strategic announcements of capacity 
expansion;
69
 
 A case alleging monopolization and attempted 
monopolization against the world’s leading producer of plain-
paper photocopiers;
70
 
 A case challenging illegal monopolization and attempted 
monopolization against one of the largest U.S. producers of 
citrus fruit;
71
 
 A case attacking the American Medical Association for 
imposing restrictions on advertising and marketing in the 
medical profession;
72
 
 A case designed to make it easier to challenge resale price 
maintenance;
73
 
 Two cases challenging the parallel, noncollusive adoption of 
facilitating practices by rival producers;
74
 and 
 A case challenging alleged discrimination by the publisher of 
airline timetables in its presentation of flight information.
75
 
The overextension of the FTC’s 1970s antitrust program was matched 
by an even more astonishing agenda of consumer protection rulemaking 
                                                     
284–85 (1984) (complaint alleging attempted monopolization in the bread sector); Borden, Inc., 92 
F.T.C 669, 671–72 (1978) (complaint alleging monopolization and maintenance of a 
noncompetitive market structure in production and sale of reconstituted lemon juice), enforcement 
granted, 674 F.2d 498, 517 (6th Cir. 1982), modified, 102 F.T.C. 1147 (1983). 
68. Coca-Cola Co., 91 F.T.C. 517 (1978), remanded for dismissal, 642 F.2d 1387, 1388 (D.C. 
Cir. 1981). 
69. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 96 F.T.C. 653, 654–55 (1980) (complaint alleging attempted 
monopolization). 
70. Xerox Corp., 86 F.T.C. 364, 367–68 (1975) (complaint alleging monopolization, attempted 
monopolization, and maintenance of a highly concentrated market structure). 
71. Sunkist Growers, Inc., 97 F.T.C. 443, 445–49 (1981) (complaint alleging monopolization, 
attempted monopolization, and maintenance of a noncompetitive market structure). 
72. Am. Med. Ass’n, 94 F.T.C. 701 (1979), aff’d in part, modified in part, 638 F.2d 443 (2d Cir. 
1980), aff’d by an equally divided court, 455 U.S. 676 (1982). 
73. Russell Stover Candies, Inc., 100 F.T.C. 1 (1982), enforcement denied, 718 F.2d 256 (8th Cir. 
1983). 
74. Ethyl Corp., 101 F.T.C. 425 (1983), enforcement denied, 729 F.2d 128 (2d Cir. 1984); Boise 
Cascade, 91 F.T.C. 1 (1978), enforcement denied, 637 F.2d 573 (9th Cir. 1980). 
75. Reuben H. Donnelley Corp., 95 F.T.C. 1 (1976), enforcement denied, 630 F.2d 920 (2d Cir. 
1980). 
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proceedings.
76
 There were almost thirty major rulemaking projects in 
progress during this period, including “proposed rules that would have: 
imposed disclosures on over-the-counter medicines; required 
inspections, disclosures, and warranties on used cars; established 
definitions (like ‘natural’) for foods; regulated mobile home warranties; 
and banned certain credit practices.”77 And then-FTC Chairman Michael 
Pertschuk had announced that, going forward, rulemaking might be 
based on public policy grounds, including to “prohibit businesses from 
hiring illegal aliens, to prevent companies from cheating on taxes, and to 
require companies with repeated environmental violations to place an 
environmentalist on their boards.”78 Pertschuk subsequently 
acknowledged that he had presided over a rulemaking “frenzy.”79 
Even if one boldly assumes that each ambitious decision by the FTC 
to undertake each of these matters, when seen in isolation, made good 
substantive sense, the full collection completely overwhelmed the FTC’s 
institutional capacity to deliver. To add new, difficult initiatives to an 
already-crowded agenda without accounting for implementation burdens 
was a breathtaking example of administrative malpractice.
80
 
In fairness, the fault for overextension sometimes lies with legislators, 
who assign new duties to agencies without considering capability and 
capacity. These new responsibilities only rarely come with additional 
resources attached. As we have explained in other work, the agency then 
faces the choice of either ignoring selected responsibilities or spreading 
its resources thin in trying to do it all.
81
 The first strategy is a form of 
regulatory disobedience, and the second is a formula for inevitable 
failures in delivery. 
                                                     
76. On the FTC’s consumer protection rulemaking agenda in the 1970s, see William MacLeod et 
al., Three Rules and a Constitution: Consumer Protection Finds Its Limits in Competition Policy, 72 
ANTITRUST L.J. 943, 951–54 (2005). 
77. Id. at 952. 
78. Id. at 952–54 (citing TIMOTHY J. MURIS & J. HOWARD BEALES, THE LIMITS OF UNFAIRNESS 
UNDER THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION ACT 14 (1991)). 
79. MICHAEL PERTSCHUK, REVOLT AGAINST REGULATION 54 (1982).  
80. Kovacic, supra note 35, at 923 (“One could understand a decision to bring one innovating and 
potentially pathbreaking shared monopolization case, but it was improvident to bring two. One 
could imagine a decision to bring one or two predatory pricing cases, but it overtaxed the agency’s 
capacity to do three at once. To do four significant dominance cases at one time might have been 
manageable. To do eight was unwise. Incumbent leadership began new matters without asking 
difficult questions about how the agency would bring them to a successful end.”); see also 
KOVACIC, supra note 14.  
81. Hyman & Kovacic, Agency Performance, supra note 9. The Dodd-Frank Act placed the new 
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau in precisely this unenviable position. Id.; Dodd-Frank Wall 
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).  
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In reciting the dangers of overextension, we are not suggesting that 
agency leadership should forego consumption and devote all of its 
efforts to investment. Consumption, in the form of law enforcement and 
rulemaking, is essential to the work of a good regulatory agency. The 
willingness to litigate cases and the ability to pursue them to a successful 
end are vital to an agency’s credibility, effectiveness, and legitimacy. 
Litigated cases set the boundaries of lawful behavior. A regulator that 
cannot credibly commit that it will challenge misconduct is quickly 
recognized to be a paper tiger.
82
 Litigation also provides an 
indispensable means for obtaining remedies for the victims of 
misconduct. Rulemaking is similarly important as a means to correct 
problems that pervade entire economic sectors, or appear in multiple 
areas of commerce. Finally, establishing a reputation for courageously 
taking on hard problems can build internal morale and attract high 
quality talent. 
Simply stated, a sensible scorecard for agency performance should 
consider not just whether cases or rulemaking are launched, but when 
and how they land.
83
 The issue is not whether agency leadership aims at 
ambitious targets or succeeds in all of its endeavors. A healthy dose of 
ambition is a valuable spur to policy success.
84
 We do not regard failure, 
in itself, as a sign of bad agency decision making.
85
 There is a world of 
difference between accepting a calculated risk and taking a reckless 
gamble, by proceeding with a difficult project without a clear 
assessment, ex ante, of the risks and the institution’s ability to address 
them. 
The critical question is whether the agency has a disciplined process 
                                                     
82. Of course, litigation does not require actually taking defendants to trial. As we noted in an 
earlier Article, “taking a case to trial and losing doesn’t help the agency’s brand—and successful 
agencies don’t need to take their cases to trial to accomplish their regulatory objectives.” Hyman & 
Kovacic, Agency Performance, supra note 9, at 1473 n.119.  
83. In some instances, the scorecard does include outcomes. When the website for Obamacare 
(healthcare.gov) failed on launch, no amount of spinning could obscure the problem. The continuing 
inability of the Veterans Administration to address its waiting lists, other than by outright 
falsification of the data, provides another example of the phenomenon.  
84. As we describe below in Part III, the FTC’s health care program is unmistakably ambitious 
and difficult. Other FTC policy successes, such as the implementation of the agency’s Do Not Call 
Rule for telemarketing, were similarly ambitious and required the agency to confront formidable 
obstacles involving legal doctrine, political opposition, and program implementation. See MacLeod 
et al., supra note 76 (describing design and promulgation of the Do Not Call Rule). 
85. FTC Commissioner Ohlhausen has noted that “a leading competition agency like the FTC 
must have the courage to fail from time-to-time.” Maureen K. Ohlhausen, Comm’r, Fed. Trade 
Comm’n, How to Measure Success: Agency Design and the FTC at 100, at 11 (Nov. 6, 2014), 
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/597191/141106ftcat100fall 
forum.pdf [https://perma.cc/NT35-8FUP]. 
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to assess, before the start of every new initiative, whether it has the 
“ability to match means to ends.”86 In particular, does the agency make 
investments that give it a reasonable prospect of success in carrying out 
ambitious programs? The challenge is to harness the personal ambition 
and zeal of agency leaders in the service of effective policy 
implementation.
87
 
III. A CASE STUDY OF BALANCED INVESTMENT AND 
CONSUMPTION 
The FTC’s health care portfolio shows the benefits of a balanced 
approach to investment and consumption. Since the 1970s, the FTC has 
devoted considerable effort to health care, beginning with a major case 
challenging restrictions on advertising in the medical profession,
88
 and 
then going on from there to bring cases involving every aspect of the 
health care delivery system.
89
 In health care, the FTC has batted through 
its entire rotation of policy tools, including numerous cases, rulemaking, 
advisory opinions, hearings, and competition advocacy.
90
 More than any 
other program, the health care program has paid the rent for the FTC’s 
charter as a competition authority. 
Consider just a few recent accomplishments. Over the past three 
years, the FTC has achieved victories in three Supreme Court cases 
involving health care. In North Carolina State Board of Dental 
Examiners v. FTC,
91
 the Supreme Court held that absent active 
supervision, antitrust scrutiny of the actions of a state licensing board 
dominated by active market participants was proper.
92
 In FTC v. Phoebe 
                                                     
86. See KING & CREWE, supra note 6, at 419. 
87. SCHUCK, supra note 5, at 129 (“What matters, or should matter, to the citizenry is the actual 
performance of officially administered programs on the ground, yet this performance may have little 
or nothing to do with how publicly spirited they are. Indeed, just as speed is a bad thing if one is 
going in the wrong direction, so officials’ zeal may in some situations actually exacerbate program 
failure.”).  
88. Am. Med. Ass’n, 94 F.T.C. 701 (1979), modified and enforced, 638 F.2d 443 (2d Cir. 1980), 
aff’d by an equally divided court, 455 U.S. 676 (1982). 
89. John E. Kwoka, Jr., The Federal Trade Commission and the Professions: A Quarter Century 
of Accomplishment and Some New Challenges, 72 ANTITRUST L.J. 997 (2005).  
90. See Jonathan Nuechterlein, Gen. Counsel, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Remarks at Administrative 
Law Review Annual Symposium 3–6 (Mar. 20, 2015) https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/ 
public_statements/632081/150320adminlawreview.pdf [https://perma.cc/VE5B-FYU4] (describing 
FTC’s reliance on the full portfolio of its policy tools in development of its modern health care 
program); Gavil, supra note 23, at 1908–09 (same); Ohlhausen, supra note 10, at 8–11 (same). 
91. __ U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 1101 (2015). 
92. See generally id.  
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Putney Health System,
93
 the Court said that state action immunity should 
be read narrowly, and reiterated the requirement that states must clearly 
articulate their purpose to suppress competition.
94
 In FTC v. Actavis,
95
 
the Court said the rule of reason applies to “reverse payments” in the 
pharmaceutical sector, and rejected a more permissive “scope of the 
patent” test.96 
All three victories were built on a foundation of decades of hard 
work.
97
 These high-profile cases were part of a larger litigation program 
that has seen the FTC successfully challenge hospital mergers (after 
more than a decade of losses);
98
 dramatically reduce abuse of the Hatch-
Waxman Act;
99
 attack horizontal restraints involving health care 
providers;
100
 and oppose overreaching forms of occupational licensing 
and other restrictions on competition.
101
 In addition to these litigation 
programs, the FTC has engaged in a large number of advocacy 
initiatives, encouraging other government entities to account for the 
competitive impact of statutes and regulations.
102
 
                                                     
93. __ U.S. __, 133 S. Ct. 1003 (2013). 
94. See generally id.  
95. __ U.S. __, 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013). 
96. Id. at 2237–38. 
97. Nuechterlein, supra note 90, at 1–2 (“I mention these victories not out of a misplaced sense of 
triumphalism, but because each of the three cases tells a compelling back story about what makes 
the FTC successful as a competition authority. Each of the three arose from a multi-decade FTC 
initiative focusing on a difficult and discrete area of competition policy. And each of those 
initiatives was built on a solid foundation of strong bipartisan support and close coordination among 
the FTC’s litigators, economists, and policy analysts.”); Ohlhausen, supra note 10, at 8–11 
(describing how FTC policy research in early 2000s, including work of the FTC’s State Action Task 
Force, set the foundation for litigation success in North Carolina State Board of Dental Examiners 
v. FTC, 574 U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 1101 (2015)).  
98. Since 2000, the FTC’s merger enforcement program in the hospital sector has achieved 
litigated victories in the courts of appeals in two cases—St. Alphonsus Medical Center-Nampa Inc. 
v. St. Luke’s Health System, Ltd., 778 F.3d 775 (9th Cir. 2015), and ProMedica v. FTC, 749 F.3d 
559 (6th Cir. 2014)—and has resulted in the abandonment of proposed mergers in two others. In 
another case (In re Evanston Northwestern Healthcare Corp., 144 F.T.C. 375 (2007)) the FTC 
issued an opinion finding that a consummated merger had violated section 7 of the Clayton Act, 
though the remedy ultimately achieved in the case is generally regarded as a disappointment. These 
accomplishments are reviewed in Nuechterlein, supra note 90, at 6.  
99. 15 U.S.C. §§ 12–27 (2012); 29 U.S.C. §§ 52–53 (2012); see also Actavis, 133 S. Ct. 2223.  
100. N. Tex. Specialty Physicians v. FTC, 528 F.3d 346 (5th Cir. 2008). 
101. N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs, 135 S. Ct. 1101; S.C. State Bd. of Dentistry v. FTC, 455 
F.3d 436 (4th Cir. 2006). 
102. On the FTC’s advocacy program, see James C. Cooper et al., Theory and Practice of 
Competition Advocacy at the FTC, 72 ANTITRUST L.J. 1091 (2005); Andrew I. Gavil & Tara Isa 
Koslov, A Flexible Health Care Workforce Requires a Flexible Regulatory Environment: 
Promoting Health Care Competition Through Regulatory Reform, 91 WASH. L. REV. 147 (2016); 
Maureen K. Ohlhausen, 100 Is the New 30: Recommendations for the FTC’s Next 100 Years, 21 
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These successes were not an accident, or the result of dumb luck. 
Instead, the FTC (a) identified health care as a major priority; (b) 
invested substantial resources to build capability and capacity in the 
area; and (c) conducted periodic ex post evaluations to identify areas of 
useful refinement.
103
 We briefly address each of these steps below. 
A. Setting Goals and Designing a Strategy to Achieve Them 
Before the 1970s, the FTC was a reactive agency, responding to 
complaints from consumers and legislators. During this period, health 
care was not a major priority for the agency. Health care became a 
priority because the FTC decided to engage in strategic planning. The 
strategic planning process was driven by the FTC’s desire to identify 
areas of the economy where it could make a useful and distinctive 
contribution, thereby delivering major benefits to consumers. Strategic 
planning made it clear that health care was a “target-rich” environment 
for the FTC. 
Why did the FTC decide to engage in strategic planning, rather than 
allow its workload and priorities to be driven by the inbox of consumer 
complaints? The FTC adopted strategic planning because of external 
pressure and internal changes. External commentators and legislators 
demanded the FTC do a better job in setting priorities, including 
focusing on difficult and unsettled areas of competition law where the 
FTC’s unique array of policy-making instruments could make a 
difference.
104
 Legislators in the early 1970s also identified the rising cost 
of medical services as a worthy subject for the FTC’s attention.105 These 
demands established the framework within which the FTC shaped its 
competition-policy agenda. 
The internal changes were less visible, but equally significant. During 
the 1970s, the Commission recruited talented managers and supporting 
personnel to spot potential high-value applications of the agency’s 
competition powers. Internal analysis and research made it clear that a 
greater dedication of resources to health care would significantly 
                                                     
GEO. MASON L. REV. 1131, 1134 (2014) (calling FTC’s competition advocacy role a “tool of great 
importance”). 
103. Nuechterlein, supra note 90, at 7 (in targeting health care, “the Commission identified a 
competition policy problem, closely analyzed it over many years with all the investigatory tools at 
its disposal, and brought a series of enforcement actions to protect consumers from anticompetitive 
practices”).  
104. See Hyman & Kovacic, supra note 4 (discussing criticism of the FTC by the American Bar 
Association’s Commission to Study the FTC, and by Congress). 
105. Kovacic, supra note 39, at 639–40. 
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improve consumer welfare.
106
 The combination of these elements caused 
agency leadership to prioritize health care. 
B. Capability and Capacity Enhancements 
Health care promised to be a difficult and risky area of endeavor for 
the FTC. The FTC was taking on a powerful industry, and intervening in 
a sector of the economy where the use of competition policy was 
extremely controversial.
107
 Although the FTC went “looking for 
trouble,” it did so in a way that gave it a fighting chance to succeed. 
More specifically, the FTC invested heavily in health policy R&D.
108
 
These efforts included influential studies of the impact of advertising 
restrictions on health care products and services;
109
 a major study of the 
impact of entry by generic producers on the pricing of pharmaceutical 
products;
110
 and a retrospective examination of the impact of hospital 
mergers.
111
 These research projects set the foundation for the FTC’s 
enforcement efforts, including the hospital merger litigation program of 
the past decade.
112
 
The FTC also used hearings, seminars, and workshops to gather 
information.
113
 Among other results, these proceedings led to the 
                                                     
106. The authors are grateful to Daniel C. Schwartz for sharing his experiences about the design 
of the FTC’s modern health care program in the 1970s. Schwartz served as a Deputy Director for 
the FTC’s Bureau of Competition and played a central role in the formulation of the new program. 
See Kovacic, supra note 39; FTC Moves to Block Exxon Bid, CHI. TRIB. (July 28, 1979), 
http://archives.chicagotribune.com/1979/07/28/page/202/article/ftc-moves-to-block-exxon-bid 
[https://perma.cc/8T28-VGYC].  
107. See Kovacic, supra note 25.  
108. See Gavil, supra note 23, at 1908–11 (documenting FTC’s investment in policy research and 
related learning about health care). 
109. See RONALD S. BOND ET AL., BUREAU OF ECON., FED. TRADE COMM’N, FEDERAL TRADE 
COMMISSION STAFF REPORT ON EFFECTS OF RESTRICTIONS ON ADVERTISING AND COMMERCIAL 
PRACTICE IN THE PROFESSIONS: THE CASE OF OPTOMETRY (1980), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/ 
default/files/documents/reports/effects-restrictions-advertising-and-commercial-practice-
professions-case-optometry/198009optometry.pdf [https://perma.cc/6LJP-TLPM]. 
110. FED. TRADE COMM’N, GENERIC DRUG ENTRY PRIOR TO PATENT EXPIRATION: AN FTC 
STUDY (2002), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/generic-drug-entry-prior-
patent-expiration-ftc-study/genericdrugstudy_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/BN8E-HB2L]. On the FTC’s 
research program regarding reverse payment agreements in the pharmaceutical sector, see 
Ohlhausen, supra note 85.  
111. Orley Ashenfelter et al., Retrospective Analysis of Hospital Mergers, 18 INT’L J. ECON. BUS. 
5 (2011). 
112. Ronan P. Harty, Interview with Edith Ramirez, Chairperson, Fed. Trade Comm’n, 
THRESHOLD, Spring 2014, at 1, 6–7 (2014); Nuechterlein, supra note 90; Ohlhausen, supra note 85, 
at 8–9. 
113. For example, in 2003, the FTC and DOJ jointly held over twenty days of hearings on 
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publication of formative reports dealing with competition in health 
care
114
 and the state action doctrine.
115
 The state action project, in turn, 
set in motion a litigation program from which North Carolina State 
Board of Dental Examiners is the most recent output. Finally, the FTC 
and DOJ jointly issued guidelines on antitrust relevant behavior in the 
health care sector.
116
 
C. Retrospective Evaluation 
Every year, competition agency officials make dozens of 
presentations and speeches. These presentations and speeches invariably 
include some version of the observation, “we’ve been very busy.” 
Although we have attended hundreds of these meetings, never once has a 
member of the audience responded, “but have you been very effective?” 
Of course, some level of activity is important for an agency to build 
capability, credibility, and legitimacy.
117
 However, to treat activity levels 
as the primary or exclusive measure of performance avoids the equally 
important issue of effectiveness. 
To decide whether a program actually worked, ex post evaluation is 
necessary.
118
 Lots of government programs fail.
119
 An agency that 
routinely conducts ex post evaluation can identify what has worked well 
and what needs to be improved. Ex post evaluation is a vital quality 
control device, and it should be a core feature of the life cycle of 
policymaking.
120
 
                                                     
Competition and Consumer Protection in Health Care. Muris/Pitofsky Conversation, supra note 10, 
at 775. 
114. FED. TRADE COMM’N & DEP’T OF JUSTICE, IMPROVING HEALTH CARE: A DOSE OF 
COMPETITION (2004), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/improving-health-
care-dose-competition-report-federal-trade-commission-and-department-justice/040723 
healthcarerpt.pdf [https://perma.cc/9KBJ-7XWF]. 
115. OFFICE OF POLICY PLANNING, REPORT OF THE STATE ACTION TASK FORCE (2003), 
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/advocacy_documents/report-state-action-task-
force/stateactionreport.pdf [https://perma.cc/VYS7-GN8V]. 
116. On the importance of agency guidelines as policy making tools, see Hillary Greene, Agency 
Character and the Character of Agency Guidelines: An Historical and Institutional Perspective, 72 
ANTITRUST L.J. 1039 (2005). 
117. William E. Kovacic, Creating a Respected Brand: How Regulatory Agencies Signal Quality, 
22 GEO. MASON L. REV. 237, 247–48 (2015) (discussing importance of sustaining a minimum 
critical mass of activity). 
118. See supra note 98. 
119. See SCHUCK, supra note 5.  
120. We are not suggesting that an agency should or must undertake a resource intensive 
examination of the effects for each matter it undertakes. For many matters, it is possible, at 
relatively low cost, to perform a “quick and dirty” comparison between the assumptions and 
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Beginning in the late 1970s, the FTC developed a path-breaking 
program to examine the effects of closed competition matters.
121
 The 
program began with an assessment of a monopolization case and various 
vertical restraints matters. In the early 2000s, the program was extended 
to hospital mergers. The hospital merger retrospective sought to 
determine the consequences of various hospital mergers that the FTC 
had unsuccessfully challenged. The results were vital to the success of a 
renewed hospital merger enforcement program, which began with a case 
against Evanston Hospital
122
 in the mid-2000s, and has since resulted in 
a string of successes.
123
 
The FTC’s experience with health care makes it clear that it is 
possible for public agency leadership to do a better job balancing 
consumption against investment. Part IV turns to some concrete steps 
that might help other agencies—and the FTC, in dealing with its non-
health care portfolio—to do just that. 
IV. STRIKING A BETTER BALANCE BETWEEN 
CONSUMPTION AND INVESTMENT 
The conflict between consumption and investment may be a policy 
perennial, but it does not follow that there is nothing that can be done to 
tip the balance a bit more in favor of the latter. Following Professor 
James Q. Wilson, we propose “a few modest suggestions that may make 
a small difference.”124 These steps do not depend on agency leadership 
suddenly deciding to “do the right thing.” 
A. Create a Pro-Investment Norm 
Our most general suggestion is the promotion of a norm that 
encourages agency leadership to make adequate investments in 
institutional capability. At conferences and in other public settings, 
agency leaders are invariably asked to discuss the cases they have 
                                                     
expectations that led the agency to intervene, and the actual results achieved. The larger the 
commitment of resources, the more important it is for the agency to evaluate whether its actions are 
having the intended effects.  
121. William E. Kovacic, Using Ex Post Evaluations to Improve the Performance of Competition 
Authorities, 31 J. CORP. L. 503 (2006). 
122. In re Evanston Northwestern Healthcare Corp., 144 F.T.C. 375 (2007). 
123. Kovacic, supra note 121 at 524–26; Nuechterlein, supra note 90, at 4–5; see also supra note 
98. 
124. JAMES Q. WILSON, BUREAUCRACY: WHAT GOVERNMENT AGENCIES DO AND WHY THEY 
DO IT 369 (1989).  
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already launched, and their plans for initiating new cases. Agency 
leaders are happy to wax poetic on such subjects—but we should 
demand that they do more than brag about consumption. Agency leaders 
should be cross-examined about the steps they are taking to make their 
agencies better off in the future. Concrete questions might include: 
 What investments are you making to enhance the capability 
of your agency? 
 What are you doing to build your agency’s knowledge about 
the commercial settings that it regulates? 
 How many resources are you spending to build better 
networks with your fellow regulatory institutions, both at 
home and abroad? 
 What steps are you taking to evaluate the results of past 
interventions? 
 How should we measure your success in these areas? 
If agency leadership knows they will have to answer these questions, 
they will have an incentive to proactively address (and defend) the 
balance they have struck between consumption and investment. 
We realize that norms are fragile. Yet, the FTC’s modern experience 
provides a striking example of how a conscious, sustained emphasis by 
agency leaders on policy R&D can create a strong institutional 
commitment to do things a certain way, even though the specific 
mandates of the law do not require such behavior. These norms can 
become an integral element of the language and practice of the agency. 
In her opening remarks at an FTC workshop in 2014 on competition in 
health care, FTC Chairperson Edith Ramirez observed that “in an 
industry such as health care, which is undergoing significant and rapid 
evolution, we must also invest our resources to understand and anticipate 
change.”125 Ramirez is the latest in a long line of FTC chairs and senior 
officials who have embraced a pro-investment norm.
126
 As the custom 
continues and becomes deeply ingrained in the agency’s culture over 
time, it becomes more difficult and costly for future leaders to abandon 
it. 
                                                     
125. Edith Ramirez, Chairperson, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Opening Remarks at the Examining 
Health Care Competition Workshop 5, 6 (Mar. 20, 2014), http://www.ftc.gov/system/files/ 
documents/public_events/200361/transcriptmar20.pdf [https://perma.cc/8QDH-TAEE]. 
126. See Muris/Pitofsky Conversation, supra note 10 (displaying the shared vision of Robert 
Pitofsky, who chaired the FTC from 1995 to 2001, and Timothy Muris, who chaired the FTC from 
2001 to 2004). The theme of investment as a predicate for policy success has figured prominently in 
the work of Maureen Ohlhausen, who directed the FTC’s Office of Policy Planning and now serves 
on the Commission. Ohlhausen, supra note 10; Ohlhausen, supra note 85. 
15 - Kovacic Hyman.docx (Do Not Delete) 3/27/2016  3:36 PM 
320 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 91:295 
 
B. Investment Budgets 
Currently, agencies publicly report (and trumpet the successes of) 
their enforcement efforts, but their investment efforts are invisible. To 
redress this disparity, each agency should have to annually report its 
investments in capability and capacity, and explain how these 
investments will support the agency’s anticipated substantive programs. 
Just as a public company reports its R&D budget to potential investors 
and analysts, each agency should specify its policy R&D budget. 
Of course, we do not believe that each agency should spend a fixed 
percentage of its overall budget on policy R&D, nor do we believe that 
every dollar of policy R&D investment is of equal value. And we 
anticipate no shortage of efforts to “game” the reporting requirements by 
reporting inflated investments in policy R&D. Still, the process of 
preparing an investment budget should force agency personnel to 
examine whether they are doing enough to set a sound foundation for the 
future. 
C. Setting Priorities and Approving Projects 
We have both been in academics long enough to see serial rounds of 
strategic planning by our respective institutions. The process involves an 
endless series of meetings, culminating in the creation of meaningless 
mission statements, backed up by hundreds of pages of boilerplate. 
Lather, rinse, repeat. 
We are hesitant to recommend anything that would force others to go 
through the same process. But agencies will either set their own 
priorities internally, or their priorities will be imposed on them by 
outsiders. Since agency leadership values autonomy, they should be 
willing to take steps that lower the likelihood outsiders will seize control 
of the policy agenda. Accordingly, agencies should annually identify and 
publicize their priorities. As with the investment budget, the process may 
encourage agency personnel (and outsiders) to consider what the agency 
is doing—and whether it is worth continuing down the same path. 
The agency’s process for project approval should involve a similar set 
of calculations. Unless the agency has a systematic process for deciding 
whether to initiate a new investigation, case, or rulemaking project, there 
will be little predictability or rationality in the results. And saying “this 
is the Chairman’s pet project” is not a sufficient reason for committing 
public resources to a project, especially when the Chairman will not be 
around to bear the consequences of that decision. Before green-lighting a 
project, agencies should be able to answer the following questions: 
 What do we expect to gain if the project succeeds—doctrinal 
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results, economic impact, enhancement of institutional 
reputation and capability? 
 What are the risks—doctrinal barriers, political backlash that 
the project will arouse, reputational costs if the project fails? 
 Who will do the project—is the team to which the project will 
be assigned equal to the task? 
 How much will it cost, and what projects must we forego if 
this one goes ahead? 
 How does the project fit within our existing portfolio of 
commitments? 
 How long will it take to accomplish? 
 How will we know whether it worked as we hoped?127 
Of course, there will often be difficulty in giving confident answers to 
these questions, and genuine uncertainty has accompanied many a 
successful project. But, a rigorous effort to answer these questions 
increases one’s confidence that the agency has the means to deliver, and 
is not engaged in a snipe/snark/shark hunt.
128
 
D. Ex Post Evaluation 
As described above, a routine program of ex post evaluation provides 
a valuable feedback mechanism that will allow the agency to assess 
whether it has properly matched commitments with capabilities. In 
comparing expectations ex ante to outcomes ex post, the agency should 
obtain a better sense of how to structure future projects, and how to 
increase the prospects for future success. A habit of ex post review also 
deters incumbent leaders from launching new projects without 
considering potential long-term negative externalities.
129
 
                                                     
127. This framework is inspired by the prioritization principles adopted by the United Kingdom’s 
Office of Fair Trading and continued by its successor, the Competition and Markets Authority. 
KOVACIC, supra note 14; Kovacic, supra note 11, at 8–10.  
128. A snipe hunt is an impossible task. A snark hunt can end very badly for those involved if the 
snark turns out to be a Boojum. LEWIS CARROLL, THE HUNTING OF THE SNARK (1876). And, a 
shark hunt may require a bigger boat. See JAWS (Universal Pictures 1975) (“You’re gonna need a 
bigger boat.”).  
129. See KING & CREWE, supra note 6, at 358 (“There would be a lot to be said for encouraging – 
and if necessary, permitting – both the National Audit Office and the select committees of the 
House of Commons to assess how well government initiatives were continuing to achieve their 
declared purposes after, say, five, ten or twenty years. . . . Those bodies might even be encouraged 
to identify and then either to applaud or to chastise those ministers who had been principally 
responsible for launching the initiatives in the first place. The thought of possibly being publicly 
chastised several years later, but still well within their own lifetime, might – who knows? – give 
over-hasty and overambitious ministers pause. It might even cause them to ask, before or at the 
moment of decision, ‘How will that look in ten years’ time?’”). 
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V. A FEW COMPLICATIONS 
A. Striking the Proper Balance 
Although we have been quite critical of consumption, we are not 
suggesting that all consumption is bad. Similarly, although we have 
praised investment, we are not claiming that all investment is good. The 
key is to strike the proper balance between these two priorities. To date, 
the balance has been systematically skewed in favor of consumption. We 
will not be able to fix that problem until it is recognized as a problem. 
After that, we will have to create the necessary incentives for agency 
leadership to “do the right thing.” That approach is far more likely to 
lead to good results than any of the alternative strategies; as one of us 
noted in an earlier Article: 
[I]f you get the incentives right, most of the big problems will 
take care of themselves, leaving a far smaller and more tractable 
set of problems to be addressed through regulation, litigation, 
and benign neglect. But, if you don’t get the incentives right, no 
amount of speeches, op-eds, law review articles, whining and 
hectoring, moral preening, regulatory oversight, legislation, 
lawsuits, or lectures about fairness and justice can take their 
place. Reformers should accordingly focus on getting the 
incentives right—and legislation that does not address the 
underlying incentive problem is not, in fact, “reform,” no matter 
what else it may accomplish.
130
 
B. Does It Matter Whether Agency Leadership Is a Plank-Owner or a 
Successor-in-Interest? 
Departments, agencies, bureaus, and commissions are periodically 
created from scratch, but most agency leaders inherit the job from 
someone else. The first agency leader is the equivalent of a plank-owner, 
with tremendous power to shape the nature of the agency, its personnel, 
and its priorities.
131
 Subsequent leaders are successors-in-interest, who 
step into the shoes of their predecessors. As such, they have more 
limited ability to reshape the agency in their image. That said, if prior 
leadership has made good investment decisions, the agency will be in 
                                                     
130. David A. Hyman, Follow the Money: Money Matters in Health Care, Just Like Everywhere 
Else, 36 AM. J.L. & MED. 370, 387 (2010). 
131. Plank Owners, U.S. NAVY, http://www.navy.mil/navydata/nav_legacy.asp?id=180 
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better shape—and better able to withstand the effects of excessive 
consumption by the latest agency head. But, regardless of whether the 
agency head is a plank-owner or a successor-in-interest, they will each 
end up making a regular series of consumption versus investment 
decisions—and it is those decisions with which we are concerned. Thus, 
the dynamics we describe are not affected by whether agency leadership 
are plank-owners or successors-in-interest. 
C. Agency Leadership Versus Agency Personnel 
We have presented a stylized example of a governmental agency, in 
which agency leadership always (or almost always) gets its way. That is 
obviously an oversimplification. Agency leadership may be short-term, 
but most agencies are full of “WeBes,” who have their own perspective 
and priorities.
132
 The key question—to which the answer is likely to be 
agency- and leader-specific—is whether agency leadership must consult 
with the WeBes about consumption versus investment decisions—and 
who gets the last word on the subject. As always, attention to 
institutional detail is critical before drawing definitive conclusions.
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D. Operationalizing the Framework 
In the abstract, investment is hard to argue with. Everyone knows 
Aesop’s fable of the ant and the grasshopper—and the moral (to work 
today is to eat tomorrow) is hard to argue with. But, “invest more” is 
spectacularly unhelpful advice. “Build capability and capacity” is 
sufficiently vague and open ended that almost anything might qualify. 
Similarly, “consume less” means that the agency will not be as visible—
making it a less credible (and less faithful) enforcer of its statutory 
mandate. There are political perils with consuming too aggressively—
but there are perils with withdrawing from the field and leaving it 
unregulated. Finally, people strive to become agency leaders because 
they want to advance the goals of that agency—and bringing cases and 
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initiating rulemaking allow them to do that. Investing in capability and 
capacity doesn’t result in favorable press coverage for a good reason—it 
is boring, and often unproductive. And some forms of consumption 
actually constitute investment because they allow the agency to train its 
personnel—and create the precedents the agency can then rely on to 
advance its objectives on a broader plane.
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We agree with these points—but the problem of excessive 
consumption is sufficiently pervasive that it demands our attention. 
Simply stated, we are not opposed to the building of skyscrapers by 
agency leaders with an edifice complex—we just want to ensure that 
those skyscrapers are built on a solid foundation. 
CONCLUSION 
Public agency leadership faces a recurring choice between 
consumption and investment. Several factors encourage agency 
leadership to favor consumption over investment. Predictably enough, 
this dynamic creates serious problems, including a mismatch between 
agency commitments (made in time t0) and the agency’s (in)ability to 
deliver good results (which does not become apparent until time tn). 
In this Article, we make the case that greater attention should be paid 
to whether agency leadership is investing, rather than consuming. We 
envision a strong investment program as a crucial ingredient for 
regulatory agency consumption that improves the well-being of 
consumers. More generally, adequate investment supplies the foundation 
for an effective enforcement agency—and we should start treating it as 
such. If we want agency leadership to plant trees, we need to make it in 
their interest to do so. Otherwise, instead of behaving like Johnny 
Appleseed, agency leaders will continue to follow the Sirens of 
consumption. 
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